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Abstract 
Gender quotas traditionally focus on the underrepresentation of women. Conceiving of quotas 
in this way perpetuates the status of men as the norm and women as the “other.” Women are 
subject to heavy scrutiny of their qualifications and competence, whereas men’s credentials 
go unchallenged. This paper calls for a normative shift towards the problem of 
overrepresentation, arguing that the quality of representation is negatively affected by having 
too large a group drawn from too narrow a talent pool. Curbing overrepresentation through 
ceiling quotas for men offers three core benefits. First, it promotes meritocracy by ensuring 
proper scrutiny of politicians of both sexes. Second, it provides an impetus for improving the 
criteria used to select and evaluate politicians. Third, neutralizing the overly masculinized 
environment within parliaments might facilitate better substantive and symbolic 
representation of both men and women. All citizens would benefit from these measures to 
increase the quality of representation. 
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At the core of democracy is the representation of society by an elected group of 
politicians. To ensure that democracy functions optimally, representation should be of the 
highest possible quality. This entails selecting the best politicians through meritocratic 
recruitment processes. Although this ideal attracts consensus, its details – such as how to 
define quality, and whether representation should be evaluated at the individual, group, or 
institutional level – are controversial. Currently, the composition of most legislatures is 
dominated by wealthy, ethnic-majority men. The ability of such legislatures to represent 
society in all its diversity is contested. Further, the narrow social composition of legislatures 
suggests either that certain groups within society are less capable of representing others, or 
that something has gone awry in the recruitment process. 
Favoring the latter hypothesis, gender quotas have been introduced widely as one 
means of correcting imbalances in representation. The emphasis within gender quotas 
typically lies with addressing women’s underrepresentation. Gender quotas raise serious 
questions about the quality of representation; advocates argue that they enhance the 
substantive and symbolic representation of women, while detractors claim that they prioritize 
group representation at the expense of meritocracy. However, insufficient consideration is 
given to the limitations of the male-dominated status quo for providing high-quality 
representation for both sexes. Male overrepresentation itself compromises meritocracy, and 
constrains the substantive representation of men as well as women. Debates on quotas 
therefore need to pay more attention to dominant groups. 
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Many gender quotas are framed explicitly as quotas for women. Even when quotas are 
framed in gender-neutral language (for example, demanding that a party list contain no fewer 
than 40% candidates of either sex), rather than targeting women explicitly, the discourse 
surrounding gender quotas has focused on the underrepresentation of women (Dahlerup 2006; 
Dahlerup and Friedenvall 2005)1. As underrepresentation is a problem that affects only 
women and not men, due to long-standing gender inequalities, the use of gender-neutral 
language does not conceal the fact that quotas focusing on underrepresentation are effectively 
quotas for women (c.f. Zimmer 1988). Even if reducing the overrepresentation of men is a 
necessary corollary of increasing women’s presence, it is never presented as the primary goal 
with its own intrinsic benefits. Rather, justification for gender quotas focuses on the need to 
increase women’s presence. 
 The thesis presented here is that this is a problematic approach to gender quotas. The 
focus on women’s underrepresentation has the unintended consequence of framing men as 
the norm and women as the “other.” With men’s presence already accepted as the status quo, 
the burden of proof for justifying presence lies with the outsiders wishing to enter politics 
(women) rather than those already present in excessive numbers (men). Men are required 
neither to prove their competence, nor to justify their inclusion. This is not to say that 
individual men are immune to all scrutiny, but rather that the competence of men as a 
category is not questioned. Women, in contrast, are placed under close scrutiny to ascertain 
whether they “deserve” a greater presence in politics. This prompts critics of quotas to fear 
that “quota women” may be inferior due to perceptions that they are less well qualified for 
office, have not had to battle as hard to enter, and/or have been selected for office only on the 
basis of their sex rather than their more tangible qualities (Bacchi 2006; Karam 1999; 
                                                 
1 Bjarnegård (2013) does focus on male overrepresentation, but not within the context of 
gender quotas. 
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Zetterberg 2008). Men have escaped the same criticisms, even though they have long been 
the beneficiaries of preferential selection based on sex. 
 To resolve this dilemma, I propose that we reframe gender quotas, moving from 
implicit quotas for women, to explicit quotas for men. This entails a shift in emphasis from 
the problem of underrepresentation to the problem of overrepresentation. Overrepresentation 
of a particular group can have a deleterious effect on the quality of representation, due to the 
restriction of the talent pool to a narrow subsection of society. Expanding the talent pool to 
all sectors of society would enhance representation for everyone by achieving a genuine 
(rather than spurious) meritocracy in which only the very best will succeed. 
 An inevitable consequence of approaching quotas in this way is that the number of 
men would need to be reduced to their appropriate share of representation (50%). This would, 
of course, also be the case for a gender quota where the emphasis was on raising women’s 
presence to 50%. However, the distinctive feature of a focus on overrepresentation is that it 
shifts onto men the onus to prove their worth and justify their coveted place within politics. 
To fulfill the normative goal of the quota (enhancing the quality of representation), the 
reduction of men’s presence needs to be made on the basis of transparent, objective criteria 
concerning what constitutes a good representative. At present, selection criteria are seldom 
codified, and are often based on outdated notions of the skills and qualifications required to 
represent others. Thus, an essential first step is to reappraise the qualities required of a 
representative. This, in itself, could potentially transform the way that we conceptualize 
representative democracy. 
 This paper combines normative political theory with an analysis of practical 
repercussions to demonstrate the limitations of the current focus on quotas for women. 
Reframing the debate is desirable both normatively, to highlight and address weaknesses in 
current approaches, and politically, by offering a new way to challenge the damaging effects 
5 
 
of overrepresentation. A closer examination of meritocracy further exposes flaws in the status 
quo. Not only are current notions of merit discriminatory, as they are applied unevenly to 
men and women and are based on elite male norms, but they also overlook certain qualities 
that are important for substantive and symbolic representation. While few would deny the 
benefit of selecting the most meritorious candidates,2 there is little consensus on the criteria 
necessary to achieve an optimal set of representatives. Meanwhile, research on gender quotas 
and representation tends to focus on women at the expense of men, and does not sufficiently 
challenge existing notions of merit. Bringing together these complementary perspectives 
permits a different way of thinking about gender quotas that addresses some of the conceptual 
and pragmatic difficulties presented by existing approaches. 
In the following section, I offer a more in-depth discussion of the disadvantages of 
current ways of conceiving of gender quotas, explaining why they are problematic for 
women, do not apply sufficient scrutiny to men, and operate on a flawed (and often untested) 
assumption of meritocracy. I then present the thesis of quotas for men in more detail, 
outlining the three core benefits of such an approach. First, reframing gender quotas in this 
way necessitates the proper scrutiny of male as well as female politicians. Second, it opens a 
debate on the true qualities required to be effective representatives. I offer a first step towards 
reimagining the criteria for what makes a “good” representative, in order to provide a more 
contemporary and objective definition of meritocracy. Third, this new approach promotes 
better representation of the substantive interests of both women and men. By enhancing 
rather than undermining meritocracy, quotas for men serve to raise the quality of 
representation for everyone.  
 
 
                                                 
2 An exception might be advocates of random selection and sortition. 
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Why “quotas for women” are problematic 
 Carver (1996) reminds us that “gender is not a synonym for women.” Yet, when we 
think of gender quotas, there is an ingrained association with quotas for women. As men are 
not under-represented, they are not perceived to require a quota mechanism. Quotas are 
usually viewed as a means of ensuring a minimum presence of the target group (in this case, 
women), rather than a means of controlling numbers of overrepresented groups (Dahlerup 
2006; Jones 1998; Lovenduski 2005). Discourse surrounding quotas tends to problematize the 
shortage of women in politics, and present quotas as a solution, leading to an indelible 
association of gender quotas with women (Tinker 2004; Tripp and Kang 2008). 
Although quotas for women are often seen as a practical solution to women’s 
underrepresentation, the causes of political gender imbalance are multiple and complex. 
Much scholarship has been devoted to the structural and systematic variables restricting 
women’s access to politics. For example, Norris and Lovenduski (1995) explored how 
women’s underrepresentation is a problem both of lack of supply (qualified women do not 
come forward) and lack of demand (when women do come forward, political gatekeepers 
overlook them in favor of men). Differential access to resources, including money, education, 
free time, and encouragement from others, reduces the supply of women candidates.3 Lawless 
and Fox (2010) highlight how women are socialized into having lower levels of political 
                                                 
3 Education is seldom a problem for women in contemporary Western democracies, with 
women succeeding in education in levels that often exceed men (UNESCO 2010). There is 
some gender segregation regarding topics studied, with men predominant in math and 
science, while most women favor arts and humanities subjects. In developing regions 
(notably South and West Asia and sub-Saharan Africa), women may still not enjoy equal 
educational opportunities to men, and historical differential access to education in Western 
societies may have a lingering effect in older generations. 
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ambition, while men benefit from greater confidence and aspiration. Demand-side factors 
may also present themselves in the form of direct and/or imputed discrimination (Norris and 
Lovenduski 1995). Not only will such behavior have a direct effect on women’s presence in 
politics, but it may also discourage future women from emerging as candidates. So, too, may 
the lack of role models for raising young women’s aspirations. Instead, potential female 
candidates are likely to be deterred by instances of public humiliation of women politicians in 
legislatures and the media (Denis 2012; Elliot 2011; Falk 2008; Lawrence and Rose 2010; 
Murray 2010a). 
 For a wide variety of well-established reasons, therefore, the path into office is more 
challenging for women than men. The many obstacles preventing women’s full political 
inclusion offer ample evidence that the current system is not a meritocracy. Acknowledging 
that women compete on an unequal playing field, the purpose of gender quotas has been to 
overcome these hurdles for women. Quotas have the potential to suppress demand-side 
resistance to women candidates, and to boost supply by fostering a more welcoming, 
inclusive environment. 
A rapid increase in the number of women politicians might necessitate widening the 
search beyond traditional political pipelines. While I argue below that this is to be welcomed, 
it also gives rise to one of the most common popular critiques of gender quotas, namely that 
they favor the promotion of inferior women candidates at the expense of more qualified men 
(Celis et al 2011; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2010; Franceschet et al 2012). This fear arises 
from a belief, despite evidence to the contrary (Baltrunaite et al 2012; O’Brien 2012), that the 
current system is meritocratic and that those who make it into politics must, as evidenced by 
their success, be the most worthy. Many of those already present in politics, including some 
women, justify their presence on these grounds. Indeed, the success of some women in 
politics is construed as evidence that the system is fair: If these women can penetrate the 
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world of politics, this proves that talent is rewarded, and if other women were likewise 
meritorious, they too would surely succeed. Examples of successful women politicians, such 
as Margaret Thatcher (British Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990), are often offered as proof 
that women can make it to the top as long as they are good enough. The paucity of women in 
politics, on this view, must be due to a lack of merit; forcing under-qualified women into 
politics to satisfy a quota would be detrimental to the quality of political institutions and a 
threat to democracy. A woman elected via a quota might not be the “best man for the job” but 
merely the best woman, and might lack the experience, appropriate background, and ability to 
fight for political gains. Even if women did possess these qualities, the association with 
gender quotas might undermine their talents, leading to the suspicion that they had not made 
it purely on their own merit (Krook 2006; O’Brien 2012).  
The arguments against quotas, based on meritocracy, assume (albeit sometimes 
implicitly) that the significant overrepresentation of men, over time and space, is the correct 
and fair outcome. This assertion is frequently contested by quota advocates, who sometimes 
even argue that women have to be significantly more deserving than men to overcome the 
many barriers to women’s presence (Dahlerup 2007; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 
2009; Franceschet and Piscopo 2014). A much less commonly aired argument is that men 
receive an unfair advantage in accessing politics. If the playing field is not, in fact, level, then 
men may themselves be accessing politics on the basis of their sex rather than their more 
tangible qualities. As such, they may not be the best person for the job, but merely the best 
man. Hence, the threat to the quality of representation comes not from redressing the 
imbalance of the sexes, but from allowing it to persist unchecked.  
One reason why the belief in an existing meritocracy persists is because exposing its 
fallacy is surprisingly complex. A pressing concern for women seeking to establish their 
credentials is how to prove the existence of merit. Men are less frequently challenged by this 
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dilemma: as the traditional status quo, they benefit both from the presumption of competence 
and from greater opportunity to demonstrate their worth. The most convincing way of 
demonstrating competence is by performing the required task. As men are already in a 
position to perform the task of representation, and as the criteria for success are based on 
previous (male) examples, men have an inherent advantage for showcasing their talent. 
Indeed, their existing presence in politics is taken as sufficient evidence of their ability to 
serve as representatives. Thus, men’s competence is rarely called into question, and their 
traits and qualifications are seldom subjected to close scrutiny qua men. Conversely, women 
frequently find themselves needing to prove their worth qua women; they do not benefit from 
the same presumption of competence, and indeed may find themselves having to disprove 
gendered preconceptions of inadequacy (Dahlerup 2007; Kanter 1977; Stevens 2012). 
 Placing the burden of proof on women is a double disadvantage. Not only are they 
less likely to have their competence taken as a given and more likely to be expected to justify 
their presence, but they are also less well placed to do so. The difficulty for “outsiders” in 
demonstrating their capacity to be effective representatives is exacerbated if the criteria for 
proving merit are derived from the dominant, “insider” group (Bacchi 1996). Getting more 
women into political office via a gender quota has the benefit of giving women an 
opportunity to demonstrate their competence by performing the role (Bhavnani 2009). 
However, the problem remains that women’s value may be undermined by the suspicion that 
they owed their presence solely to a quota rather than talent. This enduring belief, despite 
research showing the contrary (Besley et al 2012; Murray 2010b), indicates that evidence is 
necessary but not sufficient; the public debate must be reframed. 
 Women may find themselves faced with a further burden. Even if women are 
considered to be equally qualified for political office, they may still face additional 
expectations in order to justify expelling existing office holders (who may also be deemed 
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worthy) to make way for new entrants. Phillips (1995) argues that the question of justice is 
sufficient to justify women’s inclusion in politics, without need for further arguments. 
However, for those who consider it an injustice to remove incumbents from office through no 
wrong-doing of their own, the argument for including more women on the grounds of justice 
alone may not be sufficiently persuasive, even if it cannot be refuted outright. Instead, 
women may find themselves needing to demonstrate that they are not directly equivalent to 
men. Equality arguments based on women’s equal merit, underpinned by claims for justice, 
have often become subjugated in public quota debates to arguments focusing on difference 
(for example, Teigen recommends “stressing... the special contribution of women” (2000, 
63)). It is not sufficient for women to be interchangeable with men; they are expected to offer 
something distinctive, without which the democratic process is incomplete, thus necessitating 
their presence. Sénac (2010) refers to this as “added value,” with women needing to 
demonstrate that they meet all the same criteria as men, while also providing additional roles 
as substantive and symbolic representatives of women. Such a strategy is essentializing and 
can be problematic for female legislators, who may feel compelled to conform to institutional 
norms and avoid being associated with the narrow representation of sectoral interests (Childs 
2004; Larson 2012; Lovenduski 2005; Walsh 2012). There is no equivalent expectation of 
male legislators, as the substantive and symbolic representation of men are normally taken for 
granted within male-dominated legislatures. 
Scholars of gender and politics may inadvertently contribute to these additional 
expectations of women, with much work measuring possible relationships between the 
descriptive and substantive representation of women (Celis 2006; Reingold 2006; Swers 
2005). Although recent scholarship has sought to disassociate descriptive and substantive 
representation, arguing that women’s bodies are neither a guaranteed nor an exclusive 
conduit for feminist minds (Celis et al 2008; Childs 2006; Childs and Webb 2012), there is 
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still solid evidence that women do need women representatives (Campbell et al 2010). 
Consequently, women representatives find themselves faced with a triple whammy: They are 
expected to be as good as men on traditional male-oriented criteria, while also providing 
added value, yet may still be perceived as inferior to their male colleagues and have their 
competence constantly questioned. 
 In contrast, men benefit from their position as the dominant group to set the rules of 
the game, with themselves as the established players. Scrutiny of political credentials tends to 
focus on the challengers to the status quo (women), rather than its upholders (men). Phillips 
challenges the presumption that men automatically belong in office, arguing that we should: 
...turn the argument around, and ask by what ‘natural’ superiority of talent or 
experience men could claim a right to dominate assemblies? The burden of 
proof then shifts to the men, who would have to establish either some genetic 
distinction which makes them better at understanding problems and taking 
decisions, or some more socially derived advantage which enhances their 
political skills. Neither of these looks particularly persuasive; the first has 
never been successfully established, and the second is no justification if it 
depends on structures of discrimination. 
(Phillips 1995, 65) 
 If men do not enjoy a “natural superiority of talent,” it is unsafe to assume that a 
legislature comprised disproportionately of men provides the ideal balance for good 
representation. We cannot automatically infer that men are present in these proportions 
because they were the best representatives available. Baltrunaite et al (2012) find that 
feminizing legislatures through quotas leads to an increase in the quality of both male and 
female politicians, a finding supported by Besley et al (2012) and Júlio and Tavares (2010), 
suggesting that the composition of legislatures pre-quotas was sub-optimal.  
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Problems in male-dominated legislatures include corruption, with politicians in 
various countries accused of bribery, clientelism, fiddling expenses, and abusing power (Bale 
and Caramani 2010; Bjarnegård 2013; Caramani et al 2011). These scandals parallel similar 
problems in other sectors such as banking and finance, where the male-dominated culture and 
exclusion of female talent contributed to the recent economic crisis (Prügl 2012), while board 
homogeneity is associated with lower value for corporate firms (Carter et al 2003). My 
argument is not that it is a gender imbalance per se that might create problems,4 but rather that 
male-dominated legislatures comprise of a skewed sample drawn from a sub-section of the 
population, resulting in an increased risk of selecting inferior politicians. The exclusion of 
alternative perspectives and cultures may also permit bad practices to persist unchecked.  
Furthermore, the inadequacies of male-dominated legislatures for addressing the 
substantive interests of women are well documented (Childs and Withey 2006; Lovenduski 
2005; Swers 1998). Although women do not monopolize the capacity to act as substantive 
representatives for women, they mobilize more frequently than men on issues of importance 
to women, and bring perspectives to policy debates that are otherwise lacking (Franceschet 
and Piscopo 2008; Mansbridge 1999; Sapiro 1981; Schwindt-Bayer 2010). Legislatures 
dominated by male elites are also problematic for symbolic representation, as they may lead 
to a sense of political alienation for members of excluded groups (Franceschet et al 2012). 
The narrowness of politicians’ backgrounds may further undermine the legitimacy of 
political institutions (Dovi 2007). Studies indicate a loss of citizen engagement with 
institutions perceived as too remote from people’s daily lives (Karp and Banducci 2008). 
Verba et al (1997) found that greater gender balance in politics was mirrored in more gender-
                                                 
4 Swamy et al (2001) and Dollar et al (2001) did find some evidence that women are less 
involved in corrupt practices than men, although these findings have been contested 
(Bjarnegård 2013; Sung 2003). 
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balanced levels of political knowledge within the general population; similarly, a better 
gender balance of political candidates raises women’s political engagement and participation 
(Atkeson 2003; Norris et al 2004). However, if people do not recognize themselves within the 
institutions purporting to represent them, they may disengage altogether from the political 
process (Henn et al 2007; O’Toole et al 2003). Legislatures that are unrepresentative in areas 
such as gender, race, and class have contributed to democratic malaise, evidenced by 
declining levels of voter turnout, public disenchantment with politics, and desire for change 
and political renewal (Baldez 2004, 2006; Saward 2010).  
Yet, public disillusionment with politics tends to be linked to gender only through the 
substantive and symbolic representation of women, whereby legislatures are criticized for 
neglecting women’s interests and perspectives, and for not providing a mirror of society. 
There is far less debate about whether imbalanced legislatures are failing everyone, across the 
full range of policy areas and representative acts, as a result of limiting political recruitment to 
a sub-section of society. In other words, the competence of male legislators is seldom 
questioned even when the effectiveness of male-dominated legislatures as a whole is seen to 
be undermined. 
 
Quotas for men 
 A central tenet of this paper is that the overrepresentation of any group is unfortunate, 
not only due to the corresponding deficit of another group, but also in and of itself. Selecting 
too many people from a restricted talent pool is intrinsically problematic as it compromises 
the quality of representation for everybody. Solving this problem requires a solution that 
focuses on restricting overrepresentation, rather than redressing underrepresentation. It 
necessitates a reconceptualization of quotas, whereby instead of serving as a target for an 
underrepresented group, they operate as a ceiling for an overrepresented group. A quota for 
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men would indicate the maximum number of men who could be present in a legislature; for 
example, 60%, or even 50%. Although many existing gender quotas are framed in gender-
neutral language that includes ceilings as well as floors (for example Spain, whose “parity” 
quota stipulates a minimum of 40% and maximum of 60% of either sex), a quota for men is 
distinct from a gender quota, as it emphasizes the problem of overrepresentation. Indeed, 
while the focus here is on quotas for men in order to highlight the normative shift away from 
quotas for women, a similar quota could be applied to any overrepresented group. The key 
distinctive feature is the normative reasoning underpinning the quota. The central concern lies 
not with gender equality, nor fairness, valid and important though these undoubtedly are. 
Instead, the emphasis is on enhancing the quality of representation for all.  
 If we accept Phillips’ claim that men do not enjoy a “natural superiority of talent,” and 
assume that most attributes are distributed fairly randomly across the population, it follows 
that approximately half of the best possible legislators will be men, and approximately half 
will be women. If we restrict the talent pool of legislators only to men, we lose half of the best 
people for the job. If we restrict the pool further, focusing on men from elite, privileged, 
ethnic-majority backgrounds (as is the case in most polities), we remove from contention the 
majority of the top candidates. Instead of selecting the best candidates for the job, we can 
select only the best candidates from within the restricted talent pool. Inevitably, this results in 
a less competitive process, with a larger sample being drawn from a narrow subset of the 
population. This sample may still include the best candidates from within the subset, but it 
will also include candidates who would not be selected if faced with full and fair competition 
from the wider population. Thus, if competition is restricted to members of a narrow group, 
the outcome will be the selection of suboptimal candidates who would not have been 
competitive if operating within a genuine meritocracy. By having too many candidates from 
one restricted group, and too few from other groups, there is an inefficient use of the overall 
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available talent of the population. The consequence is an inferior quality of representation, 
which is undesirable for all citizens, both male and female. 
It could be argued that the effects on quality of restricting the talent pool are marginal 
when the number of elected politicians is placed within the context of the overall population 
size. Even if the candidates selected are suboptimal, it might still be possible to find sufficient 
strong candidates from within the restricted talent pool of men. However, this claim is not 
persuasive, because it is not the case that all members of the population are viable contenders 
for elected office. The “ladder of recruitment,” introduced by Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 
16), illustrates the filtering process present in most democracies by which the total pool of 
eligible citizens is reduced to a much smaller pool of potential candidates. This process is 
mediated by political parties, who play a key role in political recruitment and candidate 
selection, but the filtering principle also holds when the role of parties is less dominant. Even 
if aspirant candidates emerged in an equal distribution from all sectors of society, the total 
number of individuals possessing the qualities and motivation to succeed in electoral politics 
would be relatively low. While “natural superiority of talent” is not restricted to a particular 
social category such as men, an aptitude for politics is not possessed in equal measure by all 
citizens, any more than artistic or athletic talent is universal. If only a limited number of 
individuals possess political talents, it is important to include as many of those individuals as 
possible in the recruitment process to ensure that political institutions receive the best talent 
available. Within an already restricted pool of those possessing a flair for politics, the 
difference in quality created by excluding at least half of potential candidates is likely to be 
significant. 
 The application of a “ceiling” quota would help to address this problem by restricting 
the number of candidates selected from one subsection of the talent pool, thus opening up the 
selection process to rival groups and making selection more genuinely competitive and 
16 
 
meritocratic. Hence, a quota for men would restrict the numbers of men to help ensure that 
only the best candidates survive the selection process. Although the focus here is on men, the 
theory has potential application for the overrepresentation of other categories, such as 
ethnicity and class. The present problem of male overrepresentation is exacerbated by the fact 
that these men tend disproportionately to be from ethnic-majority and privileged economic 
backgrounds. 
A quota is not sufficient, in itself, to guarantee a genuine meritocracy; weaker men 
might still triumph over more talented male rivals due to other anti-competitive aspects of the 
selection process such as patronage. There is also a risk that minority men might be forced out 
of politics to preserve places for majority men; such a move would run counter to the goals of 
the quota. Hence, an emphasis on merit is essential to avoid the replacement of one form of 
elite with another. 
Meritocracy can be advanced through challenging the status quo, opening a debate 
about quality, and making better use of available resources of talent. For the problem of 
(un)fair competition to be resolved, it first must be recognized. The political priority accorded 
to quotas for women has masked the many problems caused by overrepresentation; however, 
the absence of public debate on overrepresentation does not mean that no such debate is 
necessary. The parallel issue of underrepresentation was also long absent from public 
discourse, and campaigns for quotas for women highlighted the democratic deficits caused by 
excluding certain groups from power. A focus on overrepresentation is now needed to 
highlight the lack of meritocracy underpinning current imbalances, and to initiate a debate on 
how to improve the quality of representation. Quotas for men would raise public awareness of 
a problem that is too frequently ignored or denied, often by those with vested interests in 
maintaining the status quo. Publicly highlighting the detrimental consequences of unfair 
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competition would also help open up alternative talent pools, thus increasing the chances of 
selecting the best candidates for the job. 
 It is important to note that the argument in favor of quotas for men is not an attack on 
male representatives. For democracy to thrive, the presence of men is essential. Rather, the 
emphasis lies with achieving a more fully competitive process and enhancing the quality of 
representation for all. Nonetheless, these goals do necessitate a significant reduction in the 
number of male politicians. (The extent of the reduction required varies both in terms of the 
degree of overrepresentation, and the level at which the ceiling is set.) While, from a 
normative perspective, a 50% quota for men would be ideal (thus ensuring that the number of 
men elected is proportionate to the wider population), a case could be made for a little 
flexibility to account for natural fluctuations of talent within the population. (An overly 
generous ceiling, however, might present the same problems as a quota for women that is set 
too low, by providing a margin within which reform can be resisted.)  
Determining which men to remove from office introduces both normative and 
practical dilemmas. Ideally, such decisions should lie with voters. In practice, candidate 
(re)selection decisions frequently lie with political parties. Forcing parties to deselect 
incumbents is arguably a restriction of the freedom both of parties to select their preferred 
candidate, and of voters to elect their candidate of choice (Rehfeld 2010). However, these 
dilemmas are equally raised when seeking to implement quotas for women (Hazan and Rahat 
2010; Murray 2010c). Parties implementing quotas have been obliged to modify their 
recruitment practices and free up seats for women candidates (Krook 2009). The difference 
here is that parties would have an explicit mandate to focus on quality when evaluating male 
candidates, rather than targeting men who were out of favor with the party for other reasons. 
Meanwhile, voter choice has always been restricted to the candidates pre-selected by political 
parties. Voters who wished to vote for a more diverse range of candidates have been unable to 
18 
 
do so. While quotas for men would not automatically increase voter choice, they would 
encourage parties to use more meritocratic selection procedures and hence to put forward the 
highest caliber of candidates on their tickets, thus having a fairly neutral effect on voter 
freedom and a positive effect on the quality of representation. A focus on meritocracy in 
selection procedures will still operate alongside other imperatives for parties when selecting 
candidates, such as the need to balance internal factions, but should complement rather than 
contradict these other priorities. 
Given the practical difficulties for parties of forcing incumbents out of office, 
pragmatists might argue for reducing the number of male politicians in stages rather than 
enforcing an immediate cull. This might be defended on the grounds of fairness to existing 
male legislators, continuity, and conserving experience. However, Mexico does not permit 
legislators to serve two consecutive terms, indicating the potential for complete political 
renewal within a single election. As slow implementation of a quota for men would result in 
an ongoing suboptimal set of legislators, it is difficult to defend on any grounds other than 
facilitating implementation. 
For the central goal of enhancing quality to be fulfilled, it is not sufficient for the 
quota to be met in numerical terms; in addition, the selection process must be transformed, 
such that those who withdraw are the weaker politicians, while those retained and newly 
recruited represent the best that society has to offer. The first step towards improving the 
quality of a legislature is therefore to assess the merit of those already present, to determine in 
a fair and transparent way which politicians should continue, and which should step down. 
Thus, quotas for men necessitate careful scrutiny of men’s qualifications and job 
performance. This ideal is easily stated but less easily achieved, as the traditional standards 
against which men might be measured are not necessarily the best ones for determining which 
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legislators are most fit to serve as democratic representatives. Therefore, to ensure optimal 
quality, we require a reappraisal of the qualities needed to be an effective representative. 
 
Rethinking the criteria for being a good representative 
 Identifying appropriate criteria for being a good representative presents multiple 
challenges. Normatively, it is difficult to isolate the key qualities required of a good 
representative without inadvertently drawing on (male-dominated) precedents. Empirically, it 
is difficult to apply abstract concepts of merit to specific individuals, especially when 
considering prospective as well as current politicians. This section considers how existing 
studies have grappled with these issues, before proposing paths for future research. 
 Many theoretical works on representation focus on relatively abstract criteria for 
determining good representatives, such as integrity, sound judgment, or rational decision-
making. For example, there is debate about the extent to which representatives should be 
delegates, enacting the stated preferences of constituents, or trustees, following their own 
judgments (Eulau et al 1959). Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) seminal work extends the debate further, 
illuminating the different requirements of representative democracy. She highlights how 
representatives may stand and act for their constituents, and introduces the notions of 
descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation. These definitions are instructive when 
assessing the capacity both of individual representatives, and institutions such as legislatures, 
to serve the needs of representative democracy. Mansbridge (2003) builds further on Pitkin’s 
definitions. She introduces concepts such as anticipatory, gyroscopic, and surrogate 
representation. Anticipatory representation assumes that citizens base their votes on the future 
promises made by candidates, in opposition to promissory representation, which evaluates 
promises kept since the previous election; Przeworski et al (1999) discuss similar concepts in 
the form of mandate and accountability views of elections. Gyroscopic representatives look 
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within themselves to their own beliefs to inform their judgments, and representatives who 
share beliefs and experiences with their constituents might be best placed to perform this type 
of representation. Surrogate representation accounts for scenarios whereby citizens feel most 
represented by politicians from beyond their own constituency, thus highlighting the 
importance of diversity across the legislature as a whole. Rehfeld (2009) and Saward (2010) 
nuance these concepts further and demonstrate their applicability to representation beyond 
the electoral context. 
While these studies are important for understanding the relationship between 
representative and constituent, they are less instructive about the specific qualities that best 
qualify individuals to serve as representatives (Rehfeld 2010). Dovi (2007) offers an 
important advance by developing several key criteria for measuring a “good representative.” 
These include the virtues of fair-mindedness, critical trust building, and good gatekeeping. 
Dovi’s criteria are unbiased, but are more useful for judging retrospectively the attributes of 
those already in office than for identifying the potential of candidates not yet elected. While 
these criteria might therefore help to identify male representatives who need to be deselected 
to implement a quota for men, the criteria do not overcome the problem faced by women and 
other out-groups of proving their credentials prior to election. It is unsatisfactory to remove 
men from office using criteria which cannot guarantee that the representatives replacing them 
will be any better qualified. However, Dovi also argues that democratic representation 
requires the legitimacy of institutions, and this is undermined by the exclusion of 
marginalized groups; hence, the quality of representation must be considered both at an 
individual and a collective level. 
These important theoretical advances concerning democratic norms of representation 
need to be integrated into candidate selection procedures, both when considering new 
candidates and deciding whether to reselect candidates. Current criteria deployed by political 
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parties to recruit candidates include availability of resources, such as the time and money 
necessary to run a successful campaign; charisma; eloquence and the ability to defend an 
argument in public; media appeal; ability to work a crowd; intelligence; and networks. Parties 
may also place a premium on party loyalty, sometimes favoring a compliant candidate over 
one willing to defend constituents’ interests. Murray (2010c) found that these attributes were 
cited more frequently than professional background or educational attainment as being 
essential criteria for selection (see also Hazan and Rahat 2010). 
Yet, many empirical studies of candidate quality still focus on income and education 
rather than the character traits driving candidate selection (Baltrunaite et al 2012; Besley et al 
2012; Galasso and Nannicini 2011; Júlio and Tavares 2010; Kotakorpi and Poutvara 2010). 
Representatives do often follow a particular (usually elite) path involving specific educational 
qualifications from selective establishments (such as Ivy League universities), certain careers 
(such as business and law), and certain springboard positions (such as coveted, usually male-
dominated positions within local or party politics). Even allowing for some variation 
depending on the nature of the selectorate and electoral system, the current criteria for 
successful entry into politics are rather narrow. They focus on privilege and insider 
knowledge, without emphasizing the need to share and understand citizens’ concerns. 
Traditional notions of a good representative do not best reflect the needs of contemporary 
societies in all their diversity. 
It is also difficult to evaluate merit conclusively using the existing criteria, so claims 
of women’s inferiority cannot easily be disproved. Studies attempting to compare men’s and 
women’s preparedness for office have produced mixed results (Black and Erickson 2000; 
Curtin 2008; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009; Saint-Germain 1993). Verge 
(2011) and Franceschet and Piscopo (2012) found that women tend to have higher levels of 
education than men, supporting the hypothesis that the bar is raised higher for women. In 
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contrast, O’Brien (2012) found little difference between the sexes, and Murray (2010b) found 
that women have slightly different professional backgrounds and less prior political 
experience on average than men. But the main limitation of all these studies is that the means 
of judging “merit” are somewhat arbitrary, given the understandable focus on objective, 
measurable criteria such as education, profession, and prior political experience. Such 
measures cannot gauge many of the more subjective criteria that also influence a candidate’s 
chances of success. The challenge of identifying criteria that are objective, measurable, and 
meaningful makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions regarding the relative merit of male 
and female candidates. 
The criteria for judging candidate quality may also contain an inherent male bias. The 
measure of a good candidate often stems from an evaluation of what came before, using prior 
examples of successful candidates as models for future aspirants. If the status quo is 
predominantly male, there is a risk that selectors will (perhaps inadvertently) favor qualities 
more commonly found in men. Norris and Lovenduski recognize this problem, arguing that 
“if selectors base their assumptions about suitable applicants on their image of established 
MPs this may produce a systematic bias in favor of maintaining the status quo” (1995, 127). 
Taylor concurs, stating that “one way discrimination is perpetuated is by the dominance of 
elite white men over...the idea of what counts as merit” (1991, 233, original emphasis). 
Bacchi (1996) argues that, though ill-defined, these criteria often go unquestioned. 
Franceschet et al (2012, 11) further note that “assessing female politicians’ backgrounds and 
preparations according to norms established by men’s longstanding participation risks 
ignoring or discounting the types of qualifications women do bring to politics, such as 
extensive backgrounds in grassroots or community organizing.” Traditional definitions of 
“qualification” and “competence” therefore may exclude criteria that are important for 
performing the role of a democratic representative. 
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Furthermore, discriminatory societal attitudes may color our judgment when assessing 
“outsider” groups as prospective representatives. When definitions of merit are applied to 
groups other than elite men, stereotypes about the competence of women and other outsiders 
may inhibit people’s perceptions of these outsiders as meritorious (Kanter 1977). Young 
(2000) argues that structural discrimination has led to a previous underestimation of the 
capacities of out-groups such as women and ethnic minorities, and the use of criteria based on 
elite male norms that are harder for others to meet. Women may therefore find themselves 
being judged unfavorably against criteria which men are assumed more naturally to possess. 
However, these problems should not undermine efforts to generate unbiased criteria 
for evaluating election candidates – on the contrary, the presence of underlying biases only 
reinforces the need to develop objective criteria rather than relying on subjective judgments. 
As Dovi (2007, 14) argues, “to remain silent about the proper criteria for choosing 
representatives is to ignore the fact that democratic citizens will not always bring proper 
standards to bear in evaluating their representatives. Contemporary political theory should not 
be afraid to challenge the judgments of democratic citizens by offering guidelines for 
assessing individual representatives.” Developing criteria that are appropriate, objective, 
unbiased, and measurable is an immense undertaking that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The key aim here is to highlight the need for further research in this area, and to suggest some 
steps forward. 
When considering which traits and backgrounds might best qualify an individual for 
electoral office, one option is to consider the core functions of a representative, to ensure that 
the qualities demanded correspond to the needs of the role. This approach refocuses criteria 
away from subjective impressions based on the status quo and towards the objective 
requirements of representation. Representatives serve a symbolic role as the embodiment of 
democracy, speaking for those who are not themselves present. They have a discursive and 
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deliberative function, enabling the voicing of different perspectives, to ensure that all views 
are taken into account when policies are debated. They make decisions about policies, 
validating policy outcomes. Finally, they act as conduits of information, relaying ideas from 
constituents to fellow decision makers, and then explaining and defending decisions made to 
their constituents. While the exact nature of these roles might vary depending on the strength 
of political parties and the relationship between legislatures and executives, these four core 
roles are common to all representatives. 
The successful performance of these roles depends both on the quality of the 
individual representatives and on their collective capacity to represent society. To be 
accepted as symbols of democracy, representatives must be of the people. If the collective 
body of representatives looks too different to the society that it purports to represent, there is 
a risk that excluded groups will no longer perceive the representative process to be legitimate. 
Thus, connectedness between representatives and represented is necessary to promote 
symbolic representation. To fulfill a deliberative function, representatives must be aware of 
the diverse needs of their constituents, and able to articulate these effectively. Just as no 
representative can embody full descriptive representation as an individual, neither can any 
individual defend all viewpoints simultaneously. In both cases, diversity at the aggregate 
level is essential for promoting substantive representation and ensuring that no identity or 
viewpoint is systematically excluded (Mansbridge 1999). Making decisions requires sound 
judgment, and conveying information to and from citizens requires excellent communication 
and interpersonal skills. Thus, both collective diversity and individual talent are essential to 
enable institutions to represent citizens effectively. Quotas for men would help enhance both 
of these dimensions of good representation. 
Focusing on the core functions of a representative also reveals that some of the 
measures used to evaluate the ideal candidate may be superfluous. For example, the case for 
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favoring prestigious careers in commerce or law is not persuasive. Nor is personal ambition 
necessarily an advantage in this context. Representatives are expected to defend the interests 
of their constituents and to promote the common good; if they instead prioritize their own 
advancement, they may be seen to be violating the principles of representative democracy. 
Furthermore, the importance of including a cross-section of society is clear if the symbolic 
and deliberative elements of representation are to be performed effectively. Lived experience 
of common concerns, authenticity, and empathy for the needs of others are all qualities that 
would serve a representative very well. However, these traditionally feminine qualities have 
been undervalued in assessing the fitness of individuals to represent others. Concepts of 
candidate merit need to be degendered, such that politicians – both current and prospective – 
are evaluated on the skills actually needed to represent others, rather than on (gendered) 
societal expectations. 
For example, when selecting election candidates, parties might favor someone who 
can participate regularly in campaigning activities, and look unfavorably upon a candidate 
who already has multiple demands on their time. As women are more frequently charged 
with domestic responsibilities, including caring for children and elderly relatives, they may 
(be perceived to) have less availability for political campaigning. However, another way of 
viewing the same situation is that women in this position show skill in managing time and 
juggling competing priorities. Their desire to engage in politics despite other demands on 
their time could be viewed as evidence of their commitment and motivation. 
Similarly, a man involved in corporate networks might be viewed more positively than 
a woman involved in childcare networks. Yet the woman might have been resourceful and 
adept in finding creative solutions to complex caring arrangements, as well as working 
collaboratively with others and harmonizing many different schedules. These are not 
negligible qualities from a political perspective, and they are also skills that reflect the daily 
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reality of many parents. Thus, a female candidate in this situation might be more closely 
attuned to the policy needs and personal experiences of many citizens – arguably, qualities 
that would benefit any policy-maker. Yet such skills tend to be overlooked by selectorates in 
favor of more “traditional,” prestigious demonstrations of competence, as evidenced by the 
types of candidate selected and prior research on candidate selection preferences (Krook 
2006; Niven 1998; Norris and Lovenduski 1995). 
Clearly, much further research is required into what constitutes “merit” and which 
qualities would best enable representatives to perform their function at the individual and 
collective level. The absence of fully reconceptualized criteria for determining the quality of 
legislators does not mean that it is too early to be talking about quotas for men. The process of 
redefining politics is iterative; quotas for men help to stimulate debate on how best to achieve 
a meritocracy, which in turn will assist the process of refining our concepts of merit. 
 
Improving men’s substantive and symbolic representation 
 Alongside encouraging greater scrutiny of male politicians, and providing an impetus 
for rethinking candidate selection criteria, a third benefit of reframing gender quotas is to 
advance a neglected area of representation, namely the substantive and symbolic 
representation of men. Prior debate has focused almost exclusively on women, with research 
considering linkages between the descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation of 
women. The three types of representation are usually considered mutually reinforcing, 
although it is acknowledged that descriptive representation may not be sufficient to ensure 
substantive or symbolic representation, especially where male-dominated political cultures 
remain entrenched (Crowley, 2004; Franceschet et al 2012; Hawkesworth 2003). One of the 
central arguments supporting quotas for women is therefore that they might facilitate (even if 
they cannot guarantee) an increase in the substantive representation of women. Women have 
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recognized interests, although their definition is widely contested (Dovi 2002; Hartsock and 
Diamond 1981; Sapiro 1981). Male legislators can serve as critical actors for women (Childs 
and Krook 2009), but the presence of women is also necessary to ensure that women’s 
perspectives are fully articulated and defended, especially on issues that remain uncrystallized 
(Mansbridge 1999). 
In contrast, the substantive representation of men attracts little public or scholarly 
attention. As men are the dominant group, it is taken as a given that their interests will be 
understood and defended adequately by legislators. Men’s descriptive overrepresentation has 
triggered complacency concerning their substantive and symbolic representation. Men’s 
interests have not been subjected to the same intense scrutiny and debate, and are less clearly 
defined. Yet, just as “women’s interests” are heterogeneous, men also have diverse, gender-
specific interests that may not always be represented adequately by a male-dominated 
legislature. Bacchi (1996) and Collinson and Hearn (2005) caution that men should not be 
viewed as a homogeneous category and important differentiations among men should not be 
overlooked. In one of the few studies to focus explicitly on men’s interests, Pease (2002) 
makes the case that, as with women, men’s interests are not universal and are not always best 
served by patriarchy or the status quo. Dovi (2007, 35) recognizes that descriptive 
representatives of historically disadvantaged groups may overlook the interests of certain 
subgroups; the same may be true for subgroups of historically advantaged groups. More 
attention therefore needs to be paid to the diversity of male interests, recognizing that not all 
of these interests will be served by the status quo. 
Similarly, while men may not feel excluded as a category from democratic 
institutions, subgroups of men may remain symbolically under-represented. LeBlanc (2009) 
highlights how many Japanese men are unable to access politics despite the heavy male-
domination of politics in Japan. LeBlanc argues that gendered expectations constrain not only 
28 
 
women but also men, resulting in obligatory performances of masculinity that serve to 
exclude most men. More generally, the exclusion from politics of many men who do not 
conform to the gendered, racial, and class norms of most legislatures may explain why 
dissatisfaction with democratic institutions is prevalent among men as well as women 
(Anderson and Guillory 1997). 
 Predominantly male legislatures can create environments which engender a particular 
kind of masculinity, based on aggression, confidence, virility, and power (Grey 2002). 
Testosterone-fuelled exchanges at the dispatch box may be combined with raucous jeers, 
shouting down opponents, trading insults, plus an emphasis on masculine pursuits in more 
informal arenas, such as smoking rooms and a culture of heavy drinking (Htun 2005). 
Research on masculinities and organizational culture indicates that male-dominated 
environments can be intimidating for men as well as women, with men compelled to perform 
a certain type of masculinity in order to conform to the dominant culture, even when this does 
not come naturally (Collinson 1988; Collinson and Hearn 2005; Kanter 1977). Increasing the 
presence of women may help to improve the behavior of male deputies and foster a working 
environment that is more respectful.5 Women may have more scope than men to disrupt and 
transform traditional patterns of masculinity within politics. 
LeBlanc claims that “if men, because they are men, find it difficult to practice certain 
kinds of important politics, then a political world in which few women participate is gravely 
distorted – not only because women’s voices are missing but also because gender expectations 
repress men’s ability to speak for the full diversity of political needs men have” (2009, 43, 
original emphasis). Curbing the numbers of men might therefore produce a more pleasant and 
productive parliamentary culture for both sexes. 
                                                 
5 Author’s interviews with members of the French National Assembly, Paris, Jan-Jun 2011. 
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Correcting an overly masculinized culture may also enhance the substantive 
representation of men’s interests. All policy areas are potentially gendered (Daly 2005; Walby 
2005), and men’s interests are already embedded within policy processes and outcomes. 
However, there are various policy areas where men have distinctly gendered interests that 
require policy intervention. These include healthcare, where men’s needs differ considerably 
from women; education, where attainment by boys has fallen behind girls in many subjects 
and countries; and paternity, where men have particular interests as fathers. Essentialist views 
on what men want and need may thrive unchallenged, even when this is to the detriment of 
some men (Kenny 2011; Messner and Solomon 2007). This is particularly the case when men 
have needs which contradict the dominant model of masculinity. 
If the culture becomes more inclusive, and the requirement to perform masculinity is 
removed, the parliamentary space is then more open to discussion of sensitive issues that 
might otherwise create embarrassment for men. For example, an aggressively masculine 
legislature might ridicule a man seeking to discuss the needs of fathers who wish to be 
primary or equal caregivers for their children. Consequently, important policies facilitating 
the role of fathers, such as paternity leave, flexible working conditions, and career breaks, 
might be sidelined in favor of focusing on the needs of mothers. Failure to pay sufficient 
attention to such issues can be detrimental to all of society. Policies obliging women to be the 
primary carers result in heavier caring burdens and damaged careers, while fathers and 
children are deprived of time together unless fathers exit the labor market. 
In another example, mental health problems are frequently perceived as taboo, and an 
overly masculinized political culture might struggle to discuss the emotional needs of men. 
Yet we know that these needs are very real: men are four times more likely than women to 
commit suicide, in part due to difficulty with discussing problems and admitting when they 
need help (Murphy 1998). Providing counseling and support for men, and training public 
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servants such as teachers, health and social workers to encourage males to express emotions, 
are all fundamental to improving men’s health. Cultural taboos preventing the frank 
discussion of such issues might more easily be shattered within a more gender-balanced 
legislature. Indeed, women might even become critical actors for men on such issues. Men 
have benefited from substantive representation by women on potentially embarrassing issues 
such as testicular cancer (May 2004). Men may therefore have an “enlightened self-interest” 
in supporting quotas for men (Pease 2002, 166). 
Though a better gender balance may be necessary to enhance the substantive 
representation of men, ingrained structural gender inequality and power imbalances are 
difficult to overturn even as women’s numbers rise (Bauer and Britton 2006; Childs and 
Krook 2008). An advantage of reframing gender quotas as quotas for men is that this 
challenges existing norms, which in turn can help to degender institutions. 
 
Conclusion 
 This paper argues for a new way of approaching gender quotas. Reconceptualizing 
them as quotas for men alters the parameters of the debate on quotas. The frames of reference 
shift from the problem of female underrepresentation to that of male overrepresentation. 
While both problems exist in perfect tandem and are equally important, the former is 
privileged in debates on quotas, at the expense of the latter. An undesirable consequence of 
placing the emphasis on women is that women are framed as the “other,” or the “outsider 
group,” against a dominant male norm. As a result, pressure is placed on women to justify 
their presence in politics, through questioning women’s qualifications, attributes, and fitness 
to govern. Women may find themselves expected to provide “added value” and risk being 
perceived as inferior candidates who were selected only on the basis of sex rather than merit. 
However, the hurdles currently facing women candidates mean that the reverse is actually 
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true: Men are the beneficiaries of preferential sex selection, while women have to be 
exceptional to overcome social, structural, and political barriers to office. 
 Quotas for men offer three major benefits. The first is that shifting the focus from a 
minimum presence of women to a maximum presence of men also shifts the burden of 
proving competence from women to men. Previously, the myth of meritocracy has allowed 
men to benefit from a presumption of competence, with their qualifications for office largely 
evading scrutiny. The long-term male-domination of politics also means that both men and 
women are held to standards based on male norms. Quotas for men challenge the notion that 
the constant overrepresentation of men is the product of meritocracy, and reduce the stigma of 
being a “quota woman.” 
 The main purpose of quotas for men is to increase the quality of representation for 
everybody. This would be achieved by controlling the numbers of politicians drawn from 
oversubscribed subsets of the population, and expanding the talent pool to ensure that the full 
range of talent is utilized. Opening up political recruitment into a fully competitive process 
would promote a truer meritocracy and a more thriving democracy. However, achieving this 
goal would require a means for judging merit. It is highly questionable whether the criteria by 
which we currently evaluate politicians are the optimal measures for identifying the best 
possible representatives. Updating these criteria to reflect the needs of contemporary 
representative democracy would potentially transform our understanding of what it means to 
represent. Reducing the emphasis on traditional privilege, and refocusing it on the ability to 
understand and articulate the needs of ordinary citizens, offers the second advantage of quotas 
for men: to improve the representative process for all while enabling women to compete on 
more equal terms with men. 
 Alongside calling for a renewed debate on the criteria for assessing representatives, 
this paper indicates the need for a new research agenda exploring the substantive 
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representation of men. This is an important but neglected topic of research, due to the 
erroneous assumption that men’s interests are fully catered for within existing male-
dominated politics. An important step in overcoming the pernicious effects of patriarchy is 
recognizing that its effects are detrimental to men as well as women, and mobilizing both 
sexes to seek the benefits that come from a more gender-equal society. The final benefit of 
quotas for men is that they offer a significant advance towards this goal. 
33 
 
References 
Anderson, Christopher and Christine Guillory. 1997. “Political Institutions and 
Satisfaction with Democracy.” American Political Science Review 91(1): 66-81. 
Atkeson, Lonna Rae. 2003. “Not All Cues are Created Equal: The Conditional Impact 
of Female Candidates on Political Engagement.” Journal of Politics 65(4): 1040-61. 
Bacchi, Carol. 1996. The Politics of Affirmative Action. Thousand Oaks, California: 
Sage. 
Bacchi, Carol. 2006. Arguing For and Against Quotas: Theoretical Issues. In Women, 
Quotas and Politics, ed. Drude Dahlerup. London: Routledge, 32-52. 
Baldez, Lisa. 2004. “Elected Bodies: Gender Quota Laws for Legislative Candidates 
in Mexico.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 29 (May): 231–58. 
Baldez, Lisa. 2006. “The Pros and Cons of Gender Quota Laws.” Politics & Gender 
2(1): 102-9. 
Bale, Tim, and Daniele Caramani. 2010. “Political Data in 2009.” European Journal 
of Political Research 49 (7-8): 855-867. 
Baltrunaite, Audinga, Piero Bello, Alessandra Casarico, and Paola Profeta. 2012. 
“Gender Quotas and the Quality of Politicians.” Mimeo, Bocconi University. 
Bauer, Gretchen, and Hannah E. Britton, eds. 2006. Women in African Parliaments. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Besley, Timothy, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson, and Johanna Rickne. 2012. “Gender 
Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man.” Mimeo, Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
Bhavnani, Rikhil R. 2009. “Do Electoral Quotas Work after They are Withdrawn? 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India.” American Political Science Review 103(1): 
23-35. 
34 
 
Bjarnegård, Elin. 2013. Gender, Informal Institutions and Political Recruitment. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Black, Jerome H. and Lynda Erickson. 2000. “Similarity, Compensation, or 
Difference? A Comparison of Female and Male Office-Seekers.” Women & Politics 21 (4): 
1-38. 
Campbell, Rosie, Sarah Childs, and Joni Lovenduski. 2010. “Do Women Need 
Women Representatives?” British Journal of Political Science 40(1): 171-194. 
Caramani, Daniele, Kevin Deegan-Krause, and Rainbow Murray. 2011. “Political 
Data in 2010.” European Journal of Political Research 50 (7-8): 869-887. 
Carter, David, Betty Simkins and W. Gary Simpson. 2003. “Corporate Governance, 
Board Diversity, and Firm Value.” Financial Review 38(1): 33-53. 
Carver, Terrell. 1996. Gender is Not a Synonym for Women. Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner. 
Celis, Karen. 2006. “Substantive Representation of Women: The Representation of 
Women’s Interests and the Impact of Descriptive Representation in the Belgian Parliament 
(1900-1979).” Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 28(2): 85-114. 
Celis, Karen, Sarah Childs, Johanna Kantola, and Mona L. Krook. 2008. “Rethinking 
Women’s Substantive Representation.” Representation 44(2): 99-110. 
Celis, Karen, Mona Lena Krook, and Petra Meier. 2011. “The Rise of Gender Quota 
Laws: Expanding the Spectrum of Determinants for Electoral Reform.” West European 
Politics 34(3): 514-530. 
Childs, Sarah. 2004. New Labour’s Women MPs. New York: Routledge. 
Childs, Sarah. 2006. “The House Turned Upside Down? The Difference Labour’s 
Women MPs Made.” In Representing Women in Parliament, eds. Marian Sawer, Manon 
Tremblay, and Linda Trimble. Oxford and New York: Routledge, 152-67. 
35 
 
Childs, Sarah, and Mona L. Krook. 2008. “Critical Mass Theory and Women’s 
Political Representation.” Political Studies 56(3): 725-736. 
Childs, Sarah, and Mona L. Krook. 2009. “Analyzing Women’s Substantive 
Representation: From Critical Mass to Critical Actors.” Government and Opposition 44(2): 
125-45. 
Childs, Sarah, and Paul Webb. 2012. Sex, Gender and the Conservative Party. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Childs, Sarah, and Julie Withey. 2006. “The Substantive Representation of Women: 
The Case of the Reduction of VAT on Sanitary Products.” Parliamentary Affairs 59(1): 10-
23. 
Collinson, David. L. 1988. “‘Engineering Humour’: Masculinity, Joking and Conflict 
in Shop-floor Relations.” Organization Studies 9(2): 181-99. 
Collinson, David L., and Jeff Hearn. 2005. “Men and Masculinities in Work, 
Organizations, and Management.” In Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities, eds. 
Michael S. Kimmel, Jeff Hearn, and Robert W. Connell. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. 
Crowley, Jocelyn Elise. 2004. “When Tokens Matter.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 
29(1): 109-36. 
Curtin, Jennifer. 2008. “Comparing Pathways to Power. Women and Political 
Leadership in New Zealand and Australia.” In Public Leadership: Perspectives and Practices, 
eds. Paul ‘t Hurt and John Uhr. Canberra: The Australia National University Press, 265-74. 
Dahlerup, Drude. 2006. ‘Introduction.’ In Women, Quotas and Politics, ed. Drude 
Dahlerup. London and New York: Routledge. 
Dahlerup, Drude. 2007. “Electoral Gender Quotas: Between Equality of Opportunity 
and Equality of Result.” Representation 43(2): 73-92. 
36 
 
Dahlerup, Drude, and Lenita Freidenvall. 2005. “Quotas as a ‘Fast Track’ to Equal 
Representation for Women.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 7(1): 26-48. 
Dahlerup, Drude, and Lenita Freidenvall. 2010. “Judging Gender Quotas: Predictions 
and Results.” Policy and Politics 38(3): 407-25. 
Daly, Mary. 2005. “Gender Mainstreaming in Theory and Practice.” Social Politics 
12(3): 433-50. 
Denis, Daphnee. 2012. “Sun Rises, French Female Minister Gets Heckled, Sun Sets.” 
Slate, July 19. 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2012/07/19/cecile_duflot_and_the_floral_dress_just_an
other_day_in_the_french_parliment.html 
Diamond, Irene, and Nancy Hartsock. 1981. “Beyond Interests in Politics.” American 
Political Science Review 75(3): 717-21. 
Dollar, David, Sandra Fisman, and Roberta Gatti. 2001. “Are Women Really the 
‘Fairer’ Sex? Corruption and Women in Government.” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 46: 423-29. 
Dovi, Suzanne. 2002. “Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman, 
Black, or Latino Do?” American Political Science Review 96(4): 729-43. 
Dovi, Suzanne. 2007. The Good Representative. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Elliott, Cath. “Cameron’s ‘Calm Down, Dear’ is a Classic Sexist Put-Down.” The 
Guardian, 27 April 2011. 
Escobar-Lemmon, Maria, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson. 2009. “Getting to the Top: 
Career Paths of Women in Latin American Cabinets.” Political Research Quarterly 62(4): 
685-699. 
37 
 
Eulau, Heinz, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson. 1959. 
“The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund 
Burke.” American Political Science Review 53(3): 742-756. 
Falk, Erika. 2008. Women for President: Media Bias in Eight Campaigns. Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
Franceschet, Susan, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2008. “Gender Quotas and Women’s 
Substantive Representation: Lessons From Argentina.” Politics & Gender 4(3): 393-426. 
Franceschet, Susan, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2012. “Gender Quotas and Political 
Backgrounds.” In The Impact of Quotas, eds. Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and 
Jennifer M. Piscopo. New York: Oxford University Press, 43-56. 
 Franceschet, Susan, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2014. “Sustaining Gendered Practices? 
Power, Parties, and Elite Political Networks in Argentina.” Comparative Political Studies 
47(1): 85-110. 
Franceschet, Susan, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo, eds. 2012. The 
Impact of Quotas on Women’s Descriptive, Substantive, and Symbolic Representation. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Galasso, Vincenzo, and Tommaso Nannicini, 2011. “Competing on Good Politicians.” 
American Political Science Review 105(1): 79-99. 
Grey, Sandra. 2002. “Does Size Matter? Critical Mass and New Zealand’s Women 
MPs.” Parliamentary Affairs 55(1): 19-29. 
Hawkesworth, Mary. 2003. “Congressional Enactments of Race-Gender: Towards a 
Theory of Raced-Gendered Institutions.” American Political Science Review 97(4): 529-50. 
Hazan, Reuven Y., and Gideon Rahat. 2010. Democracy within Parties: Candidate 
Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
38 
 
Henn, Matt, Mark Weinstein, and Sarah Hodgkinson. 2007. “Social Capital and 
Political Participation: Understanding the Dynamics of Young People’s Political 
Disengagement in Contemporary Britain.” Social Policy and Society 6(4): 467-79. 
Htun, Mala N. 2005. “Why Women, But Not Blacks or Indians, Got Quotas in Politics 
in Latin America.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago. 
Jones, Mark. 1998. “Gender Quotas, Electoral Laws, and the Election of Women.” 
Comparative Political Studies 31(1): 3-21. 
Júlio, Paolo, and José Tavares. 2010. “The Good, the Bad and the Different: Can 
Gender Quotas Raise the Quality of Politicians?” Mimeo, Centre for Economic Policy 
Research. 
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. Men and Women of the Corporation. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Karam, Azza. 1999. “Beijing + 5: Women’s Political Participation.” Paper presented 
at the UNDP meeting on women and political participation, New Delhi, India. 
Karp, Jeffrey A., and Susan A. Banducci. 2008. “When Politics is Not Just a Man’s 
Game: Women’s Representation and Political Engagement.” Electoral Studies 27: 105-15. 
Kenny, Michael (2011). “The Political Theory of Recognition: The Case of the 
‘White Working Class.’” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 14(1): 19-38. 
Kotakorpi, Kaisa, and Panu Poutvaara. 2011. “Pay for Politicians and Candidate 
Selection: An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Public Economics 95(7-8): 877-85. 
Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate 
Selection Reform Worldwide. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Krook, Mona Lena. 2010. “Gender Quotas, Norms, and Politics.” Politics & Gender 
2(1): 110-8. 
39 
 
Larson, Anna. 2012. “Collective Identities, Institutions, Security, and State Building 
in Afghanistan.” In The Impact of Quotas, eds. Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and 
Jennifer M. Piscopo. New York: Oxford University Press, 136-55. 
Lawless, Jennifer, and Richard L. Fox. 2010. It Still Takes a Candidate: Why Women 
Don’t Run for Office. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lawrence, Regina, and Melody Rose. 2010. Hillary Clinton’s Race for the White 
House. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. 
LeBlanc, Robin. 2009. The Art of the Gut: Manhood, Power, and Ethics in Japanese 
Politics. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. 
Lovenduski, Joni. 2005. Feminizing Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent 
Women? A Contingent ‘Yes.’” The Journal of Politics 61(3): 628-57. 
Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. “Rethinking Representation.” American Political Science 
Review 97(4): 515-28. 
May, Theresa. 2004. “Women in the House: The Continuing Challenge.” 
Parliamentary Affairs 57(4): 844-51. 
Messner, Michael A., and Nancy M. Solomon. 2007. “Social Justice and Men’s 
Interests.” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 31(2): 162-178. 
Murphy, George E. 1998. “Why Women are Less Likely than Men to Commit 
Suicide.” Comprehensive Psychiatry 39(4): 165-75. 
Murray, Rainbow (ed.). 2010a. Cracking the Highest Glass Ceiling: A Global 
Comparison of Women’s Campaigns for Executive Office. California: Praeger. 
Murray, Rainbow. 2010b. “Second Among Unequals: A Study of Whether France’s 
‘Quota Women’ are Up to the Job.” Politics & Gender 6(1): 93-118. 
40 
 
Murray, Rainbow. 2010c. Parties, Gender Quotas and Candidate Selection in France. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
Niven, David. 1998. “Party Elites and Women Candidates: The Shape of Bias.” 
Women & Politics 19 (2): 57–80. 
Norris, Pippa, and Joni Lovenduski. 1995. Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and 
Class in the British Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Norris, Pippa, Joni Lovenduski, and Rosie Campbell. 2004. Gender and Political 
Participation: The Activism Gap. London: The Electoral Commission. 
O’Brien, Diana Z. 2012. “Quotas and Qualifications in Uganda.” In The Impact of 
Quotas, eds. Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 57-71. 
O’Toole, Therese, David Marsh and Su Jones. 2003. “Political Literacy Cuts Both 
Ways: The Politics of Non-participation among Young People.” Political Quarterly 74(3): 
349-60. 
Pease, Bob. 2002. “(Re)Constructing Men’s Interests.” Men and Masculinities 5(2): 
165-77. 
Phillips, Anne. 1995. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pitkin, Hanna. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 
Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin. 1999. Democracy, 
Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Prügl, Elisabeth. 2012. “’If Lehman Brothers Had Been Lehman Sisters...’: Gender 
and Myth in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis.” International Political Sociology 6(1): 
21-35. 
41 
 
Rehfeld, Andrew. 2009. “Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and 
Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy.” American Political 
Science Review 103(2): 214-30. 
Rehfeld, Andrew. 2010. “On Quotas and Qualifications for Office.” In Political 
Representation, eds. Ian Shapiro, Susan Stokes, Elisabeth Jean Wood, and Alexander 
Kirshner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 236-68.  
Reingold, Beth. 2006. “Women as Office Holders: Linking Descriptive and 
Substantive Representation.” Paper presented at the “Political Women and American 
Democracy” conference, University of Notre Dame. 
Saint-Germain, Michelle A. 1993. “Paths to Power of Women Legislators in Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua.” Women’s Studies International Forum 16 (2): 119-138. 
Sapiro, Virginia. 1981. “When are Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political 
Representation of Women.” American Political Science Review 75(3): 701-716. 
Saward, Michael. 2010. The Representative Claim. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie. 2010. Political Power and Women’s Representation in Latin 
America. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Sénac-Slawinski, Réjane. 2010. “De la parité à la diversité : entre Deuxième sexe et 
discrimination seconde.” Modern and Contemporary France 18 (4): 431-44. 
Stevens, Anne. 2012. “Comparing and Assessing Gender Effects in Political 
Leadership.” In Comparative Political Leadership, ed. Ludger Helms. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
207-26. 
Sung, Hung-En. 2003. “Fairer Sex or Fairer System? Gender and Corruption 
Revisited.” Social Forces 82(2): 703-23. 
Swamy, Anand, Stephen Knack, Young Lee, and Omas Azfar. 2001. “Gender and 
Corruption.” Journal of Developmental Economics 64(1): 25-55. 
42 
 
Swers, Michele L. 1998. “Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women’s Issue Bills 
than Their Male Counterparts?” Legislative Studies Quarterly 23(3): 435-448. 
Swers, Michele L. 2005. “Connecting Descriptive and Substantive Representation: An 
Analysis of Sex Differences in Co-Sponsorship Activity.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 
30(3): 407-433. 
Taylor, Bron R. 1991. Affirmative Action at Work. Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
Teigen, Mari. 2000. “The Affirmative Action Controversy.” NORA - Nordic Journal 
of Women’s Studies 8(2): 63-77. 
Tinker, Irene. 2004. “Quotas for Women in Elected Legislatures: Do They Really 
Empower Women?” Women’s Studies International Forum 27: 531-46. 
Tripp, Aili Mari, and Alice Kang. 2008. “The Global Impact of Quotas: On the Fast 
Track to Increased Female Legislative Representation.” Comparative Political Studies 41(3): 
338-361. 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2010. Global Education Digest 2010: Comparing 
Education Statistics Across the World. Available here: 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/GED_2010_EN.pdf 
Verba, Sidney, Nancy Burns and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1997. “Knowing and 
Caring About Politics: Gender and Political Engagement.” Journal of Politics 59(4): 1051-
72. 
Verge, Tania. 2011. “Quotas’ Effects on Political Recruitment, Candidates’ Profiles, 
and Routes to Political Office.” Paper presented at the European Conference on Gender and 
Politics, Budapest, Hungary. 
Walby, Sylvia. 2005. “Gender Mainstreaming: Productive Tensions in Theory and 
Practice.” Social Politics 12(3): 321-343.  
43 
 
Walsh, Denise. 2012. “Party Centralization and Debate Conditions in South Africa.” 
In The Impact of Quotas, eds. Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. 
Piscopo. New York: Oxford University Press, 119-135. 
Young, Iris Marion. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Zetterberg, Par. 2008. The Downside of Gender Quotas? Institutional Constraints on 
Women in Mexican State Legislatures. Parliamentary Affairs 61 (3): 442-60. 
Zimmer, Lynn. 1988. “Tokenism and Women in the Workplace: The Limits of 
Gender-Neutral Theory.” Social Problems 35(1): 64-77. 
